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Duquesne Law Review
commanded a contrary result. While equity may well justify the result
reached, the instant court has subjected its decision to critcism by
reliance on seemingly inappropriate precedent rather than facing the
problem before it. It is urged that with the reasoning set out above,
the present case might have served as an appropriate vehicle to make
a significant contribution in an area of the law which has developed on
a matter-of-fact basis.
Charles J. Romito
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF AN OCCUPIER-The California Su-
preme Court has stated that the proper test to be applied to the
liability of a possessor of land is whether in management of his prop-
erty he acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of in-
juries to others, and plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
is not determinative.
Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
The Supreme Court of California had rejected the distinctions between
trespasser, licensee, and invitee as determinative elements in deciding
whether or not an occupier has been negligent in causing injuries to
a person upon his land. Although section 17141 of the California Civil
Code sets forth the standard of reasonable care under the circum-
stances, and there are no provisions in the code granting any excep-
tions to occupiers of land, California had heretofore made exceptions
to section 1714 and followed the common law classifications of plain-
tiff together with the corresponding gradations of duty owed by an
occupier.2 In Rowland, the court declared that these exceptions were
no longer justified, and that the proper test to be employed was
whether in management of his property defendant had acted as a rea-
sonable man in view of the probability of injuries to others. Section
1714 of the code so closely resembles the foundation of common law
negligence that a study of the facts of this case and the doctrines
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1954), provides:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by
want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself ....
2. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
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formerly applicable in California will reveal why this bold step should
be acclaimed and followed by other states.
Plaintiff was injured in defendant's apartment when the handle of
a porcelain water faucet in the bathroom broke in his hand while he
was turning off the faucet. Plaintiff had been invited to defendant's
apartment to wait while defendant prepared to take him to the air-
port. Defendant was present in the apartment and knew that plaintiff
intended to use the bathroom. She also knew that the handle was
cracked and failed to warn him of this condition.
The lower court granted a summary judgement on the facts alleged. 3
It held that since defendant was taking plaintiff to the airport as a
favor, there was no triable issue relative to plaintiff's status as a
licensee. Other issues discussed by the lower court were whether there
was a duty to warn plaintiff of the condition and whether the cracked
handle constituted a "trap" because defendant had knowledge of the
dangerous condition and she had let defendant come in contact with
it.4 Both of these issues were held to be inapplicable because it was
not established that the dangerous condition was concealed. Plaintiff
appealed.
The Supreme Court of California said that plaintiff could establish
at the trial that the dangerous condition was not obvious and that
failure to state the appearance of the faucet was not sufficient ground
for a summary judgement. Summary judgement was proper only if,
after proof of such facts, a judgement would be required as a matter
of law for defendant.
The court then examined the common law in regard to liability of
an occupier as applied in California. The confusion and incongruities
that were found are illustrative of the fact that these principles may
need reexamination in other states also.
The initial confusion caused by the application of the common law
in this area is seen in attempts of the courts to classify plaintiff into
one of three classes: invitee, licensee or trespasser. California and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts had agreed on the definition of a
trespasser as one who enters or remains on land without privilege or
3. Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1967).
4. It has been suggested that both of these issues are essentially the same; the trap
doctrine merely means that the occupier is under an obligation to disclose to the licensee
any concealed dangerous condition of the premises of which he has knowledge. For a
discussion of this theory as it relates to California law see an article by G. N. Rosen-
krantz entitled, Duty to Licensees in California: In Support of Open Adoption of Re-
statement 2d of Torts § 342, 2 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 230 (1968).
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consent.5 However the determination of the licensee and invitee classi-
fication was more difficult. In Boucher v. American Bridge Co.6 the
court went to great lengths to make clear the distinctions felt to exist
between the Restatement and California cases concerning the defini-
tion of invitees and licensees together with the duty owed to each by
the occupier. Then in O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club7 the Su-
preme Court of California adopted section 332 of the Restatement8
which defines an invitee. This expanded the invitee class to include
not only those upon the premises for the benefit of the occupier, but
also those who could be considered to be on the land for the purpose
for which it was held out to the public.9 Hence, in California before
the instant decision, a person who was on the property of another with
his express or implied permission, but who could not be classified as
an invitee would fall into the category of a licensee. This class became
in effect a catchall for entrants not covered by the definition of tres-
passer or invitee.
Further complications arose in the common law in cases where
courts were dealing with such persons as firemen, public officials, or
children. Although an invitation and benefit could easily be found in
the situation where a fireman is upon burning premises, he was con-
sidered to be a licensee.' 0 Since the law required an occupier to expect
a public official to come upon the premises for inspections, he was
regarded as an invitee.11 An exception to the duty owed a trespasser
was made in favor of trespassing children under the attractive nuisance
doctrine. 12 There was also the problem of the invitee who had ex-
ceeded the scope of his invitation. Thus, an invitee might during his
stay, enter upon other parts of the premises where his status was
5. Boucher v. American Bridge Co., 95 Cal. App. 659, 213 P.2d 537 (1950).
6. Id.
7. 64 Cal. 2d 729, 51 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1966).
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965), provides:
Invitee Defined
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealing with possessor of the
land.
9. For example, a camper using a free public campground in a national forest could
be considered a public invitee.
10. Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 P. 459 (1910).
11. Christy v. Ulrich, 113 Cal. App. 338, 298 P. 135 (1931).
12. Woods v. City and County of San Francisco, 198 Cal. App. 2d 958, 307 P.2d 698
(1957).
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merely that of a licensee or even a trespasser. With each change of
status correlative rights and obligations of the invitor and the invitee
would vary as the orbit of the invitation was either adhered to or
exceeded. 13
California has been aware of the shortcomings of this system of
classification and has criticized it in recent California cases prior to
Rowland. In Hession v. City and County of San Francisco'4 the court
refused to consider whether or not plaintiff was a guest, and quoting
Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc.'5 applied the common rule
of the code, i.e., reasonable care under the circumstances. The former
case went so far as to ask whether a railroad could be considered a
guest of the city since the city allowed it to construct a spur track on
which plaintiff, a railroad employee, was injured. The latter case
sought to extend the doctrines applied to occupiers of land into the
area of personal property. This would have meant that a person on a
truck could be a trespasser, licensee or invitee. It can be seen that
while these cases did not change the occupier's rules, the court's dis-
satisfaction with the distinctions between classes of plaintiffs had led
to a limitation of the doctrine.
Perhaps the strongest denunciation of the classification of plaintiff
which was cited by the instant court was set forth by a federal court
in Gould v. DeBeve.'6 Plaintiff was a 2 year old trespasser who had
fallen through a screen in a window. Contrasting plaintiff with the
poachers in 18th century England, the court observed, "[t]he manifest
differences between them suggest strongly that projecting the label
from one to the other can not rationally be an automatic determinant
of the result in each case in which injuries attributable to the land-
lord have been sustained."' 7
The problems and criticisms do not end with the determination of
plaintiff's status. The liability of the occupier according to the rules
of common law also entails the definition of the duty owed to plaintiff.
California courts generally held that the duty to a trespasser was only
to refrain from wilful and wanton acts of negligence.' 8 Towards the
13. Powell v. Jones, 133 Cal. App. 2d 601, 284 P.2d 856 (1955).
14. 122 Cal. App. 2d 592, 265 P.2d 542 (1954).
15. 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1950).
16. 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
17. 330 F.2d at 829.
18. Gordon v. Roberts, 162 Cal. 506, 123 P. 288 (1912).
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invitee there was the duty to warn against all known dangers, and to
exercise ordinary care and prudence to keep the premises in a reason-
ably safe condition.' 9
In a laudable effort to promote human safety, the California courts
had tried to distinguish between active and passive conduct of the
occupier toward the licensee. An occupier had an obligation to con-
duct his active operations with reasonable care for the protection of a
licensee 20 but he had not been liable for injuries caused by the
condition of the premises.21 Backing trucks into entrants was clearly
active conduct.22 However, the artificiality of the distinction became
evident when the court faced the question of whether failure to act
and speak up to warn a licensee of a dangerous condition of the
premises was active or passive conduct. In Fisher v. General Petroleum
Corporation,25 a licensee was killed when a bulldozer he was operating
struck a buried gas plug and exploded causing the plaintiff's death.
The court held that failure to warn a licensee of the presence of a
dangerous condition of which the owner had knowledge and which
was hidden and likely to cause serious danger to the licensee was not
active negligence.
Although section 342 of the Restatement24 holds an occupier to the
duty to warn under the above circumstances, the court in Hansen v.
Richey25 found that this section was precluded by California prece-
dent.26 After an analysis of the concepts of active and passive conduct
the Hansen court said, "[a] rule which permits a landowner to remain
passive in the face of his licensee's proximity to danger permits no
19. Johnstone v. Panama-Pacific Int. Exposition Co., 187 Cal. 323, 202 P. 34 (1921).
20. Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).
21. Sockett v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal. App. 2d 760, 9 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1960).
22. Turnipseed v. Hoffman, 23 Cal. 2d 532, 144 P.2d 797 (1944).
23. 123 Cal. App. 2d 770, 267 P.2d 841 (1954).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965), provides:
Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor. A possessor of land is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but
only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect
that they will not discover or realize the danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the
licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the
risk involved.
25. 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
26. Whether or not this decision was necessary under California precedents has been
discussed in an article by G. N. Rosenkrantz entitled, Duty to Licensees in California: In
Support of Open Adoption of Restatement 2d of Torts § 342, 2 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv.
230 (1968).
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demand for affirmative action, either to remedy the danger or to warn
of it."27 Thus, a theory that was intended to extend the standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances into those situations where
the activities of the occupier could be distinguished from the condi-
tions of the land resulted in an abrupt limitation.
Since there was no duty to warn licensees, the courts in order to
reach more just conclusions in accord with present humanitarian
standards, strained the construction of active negligence. The court in
Hansen, where a youth was drowned in a partially empty swimming
pool, found that active negligence might be found "in the active con-
duct of a party for a large number of youthful guests in the light of
knowledge of the dangerous pool." 28 (Emphasis added.)
Nor was active negligence the only theory manipulated to allow
recovery for licensees. As mentioned, the occupier had not been held
liable for injuries sustained due solely to the condition of the premises
where no active conduct on his part had contributed to the injury. The
licensee was bound to accept the premises as he found them. This
position was limited in Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres.29 That
case held that since the dangerous condition was created after plain-
tiff's arrival at the theatre, active negligence could be found in the
manager's failure to correct the condition after learning of it, or to
warn the licensee of the condition. The licensee was bound to accept
only those conditions present at the time of her arrival. This case does
not seem to have been extended.30
Another theory related to the liability of an occupier was the trap
doctrine. The trap doctrine provided that an occupier could not con-
struct or maintain a trap or pitfall into which he knew or had reason
to know that an entrant would probably fall.31 However the difficulty
in the defining of a trap led the court in Rowland to reject the trap
doctrine as a basis for recovery. In Anderson v. Anderson32 a trap was
likened to a spring gun or steel trap. These instruments are artificial
conditions of the land set by the occupier. However, in Blaylock v.
Coates33 a natural condition of the land, a tar sump, was held to be a
27. 237 Cal. App. 2d at 478, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
28. Id. at 479, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
29. 86 Cal. App. 2d 428, 194 P.2d 706 (1948).
30. Newman has been both distinguished and confined to its facts, Bylling v. Ed-
wards, 193 Cal. App. 2d 736, 746, 14 Cal. Rptr. 760, 766 (1961); and questioned, Hansen
v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1965).
31. Blaylock v. Coates, 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 113 P.2d 256 (1941).
32. 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1967).
33. 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 113 P.2d 256 (1941).
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trap. The court in Hall v. Barber Door Co.34 held that an incompletely
installed door which appeared operative was a trap. It seemed that
virtually anything could constitute a trap.
It was not solely the confusion or complexity of the preceding doc-
trines that led the present court to hold all occupiers to the same
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances as prescribed in
section 1714 and to reject the exceptions based on common law distinc-
tions. As pointed out by Justice Peters, "[c]omplexity can be borne
and confusion remedied where the underlying principles governing
liability are based upon proper considerations."35 The court men-
tioned the theory that the special rules applied to occupiers were due
to the dominance of the landowning class in England during the
formative period of the rules. The court went on to hold that such
distinctions based on the status of the injured party were no longer
justified in the light of modern society, regardless of their origin.
It is submitted that California's precedents reveal the efforts of courts
to define the liability of an occupier in accordance to the standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances without rejecting the com-
mon law principles on the liability of an occupier. Rather than con-
tinue to expand and strain the existing doctrines, the Supreme Court
of California has chosen to look ahead to the goal sought, and having
recognized it as the standard proclaimed in its Civil Code, has aban-
doned the common law exceptions. Other courts should also look to
see if the present obscure distinctions and artificial constructions
being applied in their states are not leading to a similar goal.
It should be remembered that the court has not precluded all con-
siderations of the nature of plaintiff's visit. The court has recognized
that plaintiff's status may have "some bearing on the question of lia-
bility."36 The effect of this statement remains to be seen. It has been
speculated that the abolishment of the distinctions between entrants
would not make much difference in the results of the cases because
the considerations used in determining plaintiff's status are the same
factors involved in deciding whether a man has acted reasonably
under the circumstances. 37 In the cases where this is true, little has
been gained, but there are enough arbitrary and capricious results to
322
34. 218 Cal. 412, 23 P.2d 279 (1933).
35. 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103, 443 P.2d at 567.
36. Id. at 104, 443 P.2d at 568.
37. Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MoD. L. Rav. 359 (1958).
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justify the declaration of the Supreme Court of California that plain-
tiff's status will no longer be determinative.
A. Kathleen Kelly
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DEATH IN STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Penn-
sylvania law governs an action commenced by the administrator of
the estate of a Pennsylvania decedent killed in the crash of an aircraft
into the harbor waters of Boston.
Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1968).
Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of a Pennsylvania resident killed
in the crash of an Eastern Air Lines jet into Boston Harbor, filed suit
on the "law side"' of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to recover damages for the death of the decedent. Juris-
diction was based on diversity of citizenship and an amount in excess
of the statutory minimum. Plaintiff alleged that the fatality occurred
as the result of Eastern's negligent operation of its jetliner and its
breach of the contract with decedent for nonnegligent carriage.2
After hearing evidence as to liability, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff. The court then permitted testimony on damages, and
over Eastern's objection, instructed the jury to award them in ac-
cordance with the law of Pennsylvania. 3 The jury returned with
verdicts for plaintiff in the sum of $2,500 as compensation under the
1. Since the 1966 coalescence of civil and maritime procedure, this term has become
somewhat imprecise. Today, all actions, whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or
in admiralty are governed by the same rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. However, cases brought
pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court are exempt from certain rules
and subject to several others that do not affect other civil actions. For a complete discus-
sion of the unification of the civil and admiralty procedures, see 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE $ .01 et seq. (2d ed. 1966).
2. Plaintiff abandoned a breach of warranty theory before the case came to trial.
3. Eastern had requested the court to charge that damages were to be awarded in
accordance with the law of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts statutes in effect at the
time of the accident limited the liability of one whose negligence has caused the death
of another to "damages in the sum of not less than two thousand dollars nor more than
twenty thousand dollars to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability" and
also permitted recovery for expenses incurred as a result of the wrong. MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1958). See also, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2) (1958).
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